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DAMAGES, EQUITY, AND RESTITUTION-
ILLINOIS REMEDIAL OPTIONS
Terrence F. Kiely*
In this Article, Professor Kiely presents a unified Remedies approach
to the legal concepts of Damages, Equity, and Restitution. He surveys
Illinois decisions in the Damages area including personal injury and death,
interest on judgments, and injuries to personalty and realty. In the Equity
field, he discusses the concepts of restitution, injunctions, and the equitable
defenses available to defendants. The author concludes his Article with
an analysis of Illinois' confusing election of remedies doctrine.
I. INTRODUCTION
HE past decade has witnessed an ever increasing focus upon
problems relating to constitutional law, criminal procedure, and
the rights of the economically disadvantaged. As a result, the
more traditional areas of damages, equity, and restitution have been
de-emphasized in both law school curriculums and legal journals. In
response to concerns felt by the bar and legal educators alike, these
topics have been revived in the form of a broader analytical concept
labeled "remedies." By combining these topics as one course and
stressing the remedial aspects of the subject matters, the twin goals
of resurrecting interest in these areas and maximizing their utility
to the practicing bar have hopefully been achieved.1
This current model for law school study reinforces the necessity
for the practicing lawyer to approach a legal problem from the stand-
point of "options." Having arrived at the substantive grounds for
relief, the lawyer should take a close look at the advantages, disad-
vantages, and dangers involved in choosing among several available
remedies or "options." This provides a safe, sound basis for further
proceedings.
* Associate Professor, DePaul University College of Law.
1. Until relatively recent times, separate courses in Equity, Restitution, or Dam-
ages were offered with varying degrees of frequency. In addition, topics included
within those subjects were and continue to be touched on in the context of other sub-
stantive courses such as Contracts, Torts, etc.
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Another advantage of the unified format of the current model is
that it gives the students the opportunity to engage in continual prob-
lem solving involving numerous areas of concentration. This de-
velops analytical skills that will serve them well in the future.
Finally, the current analytical approach has the merit of bringing
home to the practitioner, in a much more realistic and practical man-
ner, the relationship between "law" and the "principles" of equity
jurisprudence.'
This Article, although limited to a discussion of the decisions ren-
dered in the past year by Illinois courts,' will adhere to this basic
approach. Because treatment of the damage rule structure and re-
medial option base for cases involving the sale of goods is more ap-
propriate in a study of the Uniform Commercial Code,4 these topics
will not be included in this Article.
Consequently, this Article will deal with three basic topics: dam-
ages, equity, and election of remedies. The section on damages is
a compendium of the recent decisions involving personal injury and
death, interest on judgments, injuries to interests in personal prop-
erty, and injuries to interests in realty. The discussion of equity will
survey cases focusing on restitution, the devices of equity utilized
to effectuate restitution (the constructive trust, accounting, and re-
ceivership), the injunction, and the limits of equitable relief (laches,
equitable estoppel, and the "clean hands" doctrine). The conclud-
ing section will deal with aspects of the confusing and often mis-
understood doctrine of election of remedies.
H. DAMAGES
Personal Injury and Death
In two recent appellate court decisions, Bireline v. Espenscheid5
2. This particular benefit of the combined approach is felt by the author to be
the major benefit of a separate Remedies course.
3. The cases to be analyzed in this Article have been selected from volumes 305
to 315 of the Northeastern Reporter Second.
4. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26 (1973). For a discussion of recent Illinois cases
in the U.C.C.--Sales area, see Benett, Illinois Developments in Contracts-Sales,
1973-1974 Survey of Illinois Law, 24 DEPAUL L. REv. 341 (1975).
5. 15 Ill. App. 3d 368, 304 N.E.2d 508 (3d Dist. 1973).
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and Cargnino v. Smith,' the collateral source rule, a major point of
contention among defense counsel,7 received further judicial sup-
port. Simply stated, the collateral source rule provides that the
benefits received by a plaintiff from a source wholly independent
and "collateral" to the tortfeasor will not diminish the amount of
damages otherwise recoverable."
The main focus of this concept has been directed to the receipt
of insurance proceeds by the plaintiff, since the rule provides that
the defendant may neither raise in the course of trial nor deduct
from any award any hospitalization, medical, or other compensatory
payments inuring to the plaintiff.' The rule, while not limited to
the receipt of insurance proceeds or other collateral sources for
which the plaintiff has paid some consideration, has been used as
the conceptual basis for preventing the plaintiff from raising the fact
that he has no collateral source to rely upon.10 As will be seen,
the proper application of the concept has often been blurred by its
use in instances which could have been more appropriately decided
on the basis of the substantial prejudice or irrelevancy of the evi-
dence presented, even though those two factors lie at the heart of
the rule itself.
In Espenscheid," an action for injuries brought under the Dram
Shop Act, the defendants sought to introduce evidence of medical
payments made to the plaintiff by his health insurance carrier, argu-
ing (1) that the Dram Shop Act, when discussing "injury to prop-
erty,"" intended to limit recovery to those items set out in the
Family Expense Statute'" and (2) that that statute only provided for
recovery of obligations in fact owed or personally paid by the plain-
6. 17 111. App. 3d 831, 308 N.E.2d 853 (5th Dist. 1974).
7. See, e.g., Cooper, A Collateral Benefits Principle, 49 CAN. B. REV. 501
(1971); Morceri & Messina, Collateral Source Rule in Personal Injury Litigation, 7
GONZAGA L. REV. 310 (1972).
8. 15 Ill. App. 3d at 370, 304 N.E.2d at 510.
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Gontarz, 309 N.E.2d 196 (1974) (plaintiff's statement
to the jury that he had elected not to seek Workmen's Compensation payments held
violative of the rule).
11. 15 I1. App. 3d 368, 304 N.E.2d 508 (3d Dist. 1974).
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1973).
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 15 (1973).
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tiff. In rejecting the defendant's theory that the collateral source
rule was inapplicable in this statutory cause of action, the court held
that the mere fact that the elements of special damage fell within
the scope of obligations covered by the Family Expense Statute did
not alter the clear applicability of the collateral source rule.14
In the more unique decision of Cargnino v. Smith,' 5 the fifth ap-
pellate district discussed, in the context of the collateral source rule,
the weight to be given the plaintiffs claim for lost wages in light
of his receipt of total disability payments from the United States gov-
ernment for emphysema and black lung disease. The plaintiff was
hit by the defendant's automobile as he walked along a roadway.
Medical testimony was introduced establishing that the plaintiff
would be unable to work for a year because of the injuries received
in the accident.
The plaintiff, a coal miner, was classified as totally disabled under
government standards and was receiving monthly disability pay-
ments. The defendant, over objection, introduced evidence of the
plaintiffs payments to establish the fact that there could be no lost
wages for the ensuing year due to the plaintiffs total disability.
Medical testimony was offered by the plaintiff to further establish
the fact that emphysema and black lung were progressively disabling
diseases and that he was capable of working even though his disorders
had progressed sufficiently to meet the government standards for
receipt of total disability payments.
The court, on the basis of the collateral source rule, reversed a
verdict in defendant's favor, stating:
The uncontroverted testimony was that plaintiff was disabled from working
for at least a year solely because of injuries received in the accident, totally
distinct from his emphysema and black lung conditions. Thus, testimony of
black lung and social security benefits was improper under the collateral
source rule.18
As to the ability of defendant to utilize the fact of plaintiff's govern-
ment classification, the court held that the manner in which total dis-
ability was determined for purposes of the receipt of benefits was
irrelevant to the issue of plaintiffs actual ability to work:
14. 15 Ill. App. 3d at 370, 304 N.E.2d at 510.
15. 17 Ill. App. 3d 831, 308 N.E.2d 853 (5th Dist. 1974).
16. Id. at 834, 308 N.E.2d at 856.
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We do not mean to suggest that evidence of plaintiff's prior physical condi-
tion, including black lung disease and emphysema, is to be excluded. How-
ever, plaintiff's prior physical condition can be established without any ref-
erence to governmental agencies' standards for disabilities from unrelated
causes or any reference to benefits which such agencies disburse.17
The Espenscheid and Smith cases thus lend further support to the
principle that a tortfeasor should not benefit from the fact that the
injured party receives compensation from a collateral source. While
the rule appears anomalous in light of the fact that compensatory
damages are presumed to be economic in nature and serve to make
the plaintiff "whole," the punitive aspect of the plaintiff's double re-
covery has received little or no discussion in the case law. The ef-
fect of the collateral source rule and the open-ended concept of
"pain and suffering" on the alleged economic base of personal injury
awards will be discussed further in this Article after the subjects of
punitive damages and wrongful death are analyzed.
In the area of wrongful death and the relationship between that
statutory cause of action' and actions for personal injuries that sur-
vive under the Survival Act,'9 The Supreme Court of Illinois, in the
case of Murphy v. Martin Oil Co.,20 has eliminated the unitary death
concept and joined the vast majority of jurisdictions throughout the
nation.
Based upon the nearly century old authority of Holton v. Daly,2
Illinois courts, with certain important exceptions, 2 have consistently
held that if a decedent's death was the direct result of injuries upon
which an action for injuries was based, such action abated. There-
after, the only vehicle for recovery was an action for pecuniary loss
to the widow and next-of-kin under the Wrongful Death Act. The
only times the action for injuries survived under the statute were in
instances where the death resulted from causes unrelated to the
conduct of defendant.
17. Id.
18. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 1-2 (1973).
19. ILL. Rpy. STAT. ch. 3, § 339 (1973).
20. 56 Ill. 2d 423, 308 N.E.2d 583 (1974).
21. 106 I1. 131 (1882).
22. See generally Note, Death of the Abatement Doctrine-Murphy v. Martin Oil
Co., 1973-1974 Survey of Illinois Law, 24 DEPAUL L. REV. 608 (1975).
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In Martin Oil, the plaintiff administratix brought an action for the
wrongful death of her husband with a separate count for the personal
injuries suffered by him during the nine-day period between the date
of his injury and directly resulting death. At the trial level, plain-
tiff's second count was dismissed.
The supreme court, speaking through Justice Ward, after an
examination of opposing case law in most of ,the other jurisdictions
and a series of Illinois decisions that had eroded the unitary death
concept,28 reversed Holton v. Daly and its progeny. The court de-
clared that, henceforth, if death were not instantaneous, an action
for personal injuries shall not abate even if death results directly
from the injuries received, and that the action may be maintained
contemporaneously with an action for pecuniary loss under the
Wrongful Death Act.
The 'basis for the ruling, stated Justice Ward, was the basic unfair-
ness of the prior conceptual posture:
To say that there can be recovery only for his wrongful death is to provide
an obviously inadequate justice. Too, the result in such a case is that the
wrongdoer will have to answer for only a portion of the damages he
caused. Incongruously, if the injury is so severe that death results, the
wrongdoer's liability for the damages before death will be extinguished. It
is obvious that in order to have a full liability and a full recovery there
must be an action allowed for damages up to the time of death, as well as
thereafter.24
This decision, long overdue, rectifies an unjust response to the
legitimate claims of scores of families who have suffered through the
injury and eventual death of a loved one. The ruling, allowing for
the maintenance of both actions, is, however, bound to raise several
crucial issues due to the separate conceptual bases for damage valua-
tion in the two actions.
The Wrongful Death Act limits recovery to loss of support or "pe-
cunicary loss" and formally excludes recovery on items such as
medical bills, lost wages, and other items of special damages as well
as general damages for pain and suffering. The traditional common
law action for injuries, on the other hand, includes all those items
23. Id.
24. 56 Ill. 2d at 431, 308 N.E.2d at 587. See also Wonaitis v. Kustak, 18 111.
App. 3d 17, 309 N.E.2d 300 (lst Dist. 1974).
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as well as punitive damages in appropriate instances. While a dis-
cussion of the nature of pecuniary loss under the Wrongful Death
and Dram Shop Acts will follow shortly, it is important at this point
to note a decision rendered after Murphy v. Martin Oil Co.,25 holding
punitive damages unavailable under the survival statute.
In Mattyasovsky v. West Towns Bus Co.,20 a wrongful death ac-
tion was brought against the defendant for the death of the plain-
,tiffs twelve year old son, who died shortly after the injury. The
plaintiff in his complaint for wrongful death sought both pecuniary
loss and punitive damages. The jury awarded the plaintiff pecuniary
loss damages in the amount of $75,00027 and $50,000 in punitive
damages. Three months after trial, the plaintiff was allowed to
amend the original complaint -to include a count for the decedent's
personal injuries, pursuant to the Survival Act.
The defendant, on appeal, argued that punitive damages are not
recoverable either under the Wrongful Death Act or the Survival
Act, and that since wrongful death was the only theory utilized at
trial, the punitive damage award must fall. The plaintiff agreed with
respect to the Wrongful Death Act issue, but argued that the Survival
Act simply allows for -the continuation, by the estate, of the complete
personal injury action and that punitive damages, where appropriate,
are always available in a common law action for injuries. Since his
later amendment cured any conceptual defects regarding the nature
of his claims, the plaintiff sought affirmance of the award under the
reasoning in Murphy v. Martin Oil Co.28
While noting recent decisions in other jurisdictions allowing puni-
tive damage awards in action for injuries brought pursuant to comp-
arable survival statutes,29 the court, speaking through Justice Moran,
25. 56 I11. 2d 423, 308 N.E.2d 583 (1974).
26. 21 Ill. App. 3d 46, 313 N.E.2d 496 (2d Dist. 1974).
27. The award was reduced to $30,000, the statutory limit in effect at the times
relevant to the case.
28. The court distinguished Martin Oil on the basis that it did not state that puni-
tive damages were recoverable under the combined theory, but simply eliminated the
unitary death concept in Illinois.
29. See, e.g., Hennigan v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 282 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Pa.
1967), aff'd, 400 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 904 (1969); Reyn-
olds v. Willis, 58 Del. 368, 209 A.2d 760 (1965). See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS,
§ 908, comment (a) (1939).
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nevertheless felt compelled to reject the admitted logic of the cases
and plaintiffs position:
Despite our highest desires, however, law is not always based upon logical
rationale. The survival action for damages for injury to the person is a
creature of statute and the intent of the legislature, as expressed in the
statute, is controlling. The words "damages for injury to the person"
clearly and unequivocally mean damages of a physical character ...
Punitive damages are not damages of a physical character. They are those
assessed in the interests of society to punish the defendant and to warn him
and others that such acts are offenses against society.3 0
Maintaining that the words of a statute must be construed to take
their "ordinary, popularly accepted meaning," the court held puni-
tive damage awards unavailable under the Survival Act and vacated
the jury award.
It is submitted that the court gave an unduly restrictive interpre-
tation to the relevant position of the Survival Act, treating it, in ef-
fect, as a separate statutory cause of action, providing for recovery
where none was allowed under any circumstances at common law.
The Wrongful Death and Dram Shop Acts are clear examples of the
latter type. The Survival Act, on the contrary, does not create a
cause of action where none existed before, but simply prevents a
common law action for injuries, in its full scope, from abating upon
death. By treating such actions as being limited by the statute, the
court is reverting to the posture of unfairness noted by the supreme
court in Murphy v. Martin Oil Co. as the basis for abandoning the
unitary death concept.
Wrongful Death
Under Illinois law, damages resulting from the death of a family
member are allowed only by virtue of statute because there is no
common law action for death. In the case of an action for the death
of a lineal descendant, brought under the Wrongful Death Act,31
Illinois law provides for the presumption of substantial pecuniary
loss.3 2 Three recent decisions, Goldstein v. Hertz Corp.,"a Prather
30. 21 Ill. App. 3d at 54, 313 N.E.2d at 502.
31. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 1-2 (1973). Other statutory death actions include
those brought under the Dram Shop Act and the Structural Work Act. See discussion
pp. 285-91 infra.
32. ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2d, § 31.01 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as IPI 2d].
33. 16 Ill. App. 3d 89, 305 N.E.2d 617 (Ist Dist. 1973).
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v. Lockwood 4 and Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co.,85 are
concerned with the strength of the presumption of substantial pecu-
niary loss with respect to the death of minor lineal descendants.
While the mechanics of proof of pecuniary loss in cases of adult
breadwinners-i.e., the computation, over decedent's working life,
of his annual gross income, fixed benefits, contributions to home
upkeep, and contributions to the religious and moral training of the
children, minus the amount taken for his personal use8 -- bring into
sharper focus the realities of the presumed loss, the presumption in
cases of minor decedents, unless rebutted in some special cases, is
obviously rank with speculation. In these instances, as will be seen,
the alleged economic base for pecuniary loss recovery is subject to
the same criticisms that are directed toward open-ended awards for
pain and suffering in personal injury cases and toward cases invoking
the collateral source rule.
In Goldstein v. Hertz Corp., 7 the decedent, the plaintiffs daugh-
ter, was twenty years old at the time of her death in an automobile
collision. The jury found for the plaintiff, awarding loss of support
damages in the amount of $80,000. The award was reduced to the
statutory limit of $30,000 then in effect."' The defendant argued
that the award was excessive in light of the meager evidence presented
by the plaintiff to support the rebuttable presumption of substantial
pecuniary loss. The plaintiff's evidence consisted of the fact that
the decedent was an excellent student of the University of Illinois,
had worked part-time earning seventy dollars per week, was helpful
around the house and had a close relationship with the other family
members. The court, without raising questions about the reality of
the alleged loss of pecuniary support, noted the existence of the
presumption and held the award not excessive on the evidence pre-
sented.
Prather v. Lockwood, 9 on the other hand, concerned the ade-
34. 19 Il1. App. 3d 146, 310 N.E.2d 815 (4th Dist. 1974).
35. 21 111. App. 3d 46, 313 N.E.2d 496 (2d Dist. 1974).
36. Demos, Measure of Damages-Wrongful Death, 60 ILL. B.J. 518 (1972).
37. 16 Il1. App. 3d 89, 305 N.E.2d 617 (1st Dist. 1973).
38. In 1967, the Illinois legislature removed any damage limitation for wrongful
death pecuniary loss awards. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1967).
39. 19 Ill. App. 3d 146, 310 N.E.2d 815 (4th Dist. 1974).
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quacy of an award of $2,000 to the mother of an eighteen year old
mentally handicapped son also killed as the result of an automobile
collision. Testimony was presented that established the decedent's
good physical condition, that while he never finished high school,
he was enrolled in the Educable Mental Health program at Illinois
State University, and that he earned seventy dollars a week, twenty
of which went to his mother. The record was silent as to the extent
of his retardation, his progress at the school, or his life expectancy.
The court, on appeal, while noting the presumption of substantial
pecuniary loss in cases involving the death of lineal descendants,
stressed the rebuttable nature of such presumption in light of -the
realities of pecuniary loss presented by the evidence:
It is not debatable but that a presumption arises of loss to a lineal descend-
ant from wrongful death. That presumption is to be considered if there is
no other evidence on the issue, or if there is evidence that presumption
should be weighed by the jury with such other evidence. 40
Noting the earlier decision of Flynn v. Vancil,41 which held the evi-
dence warranted a jury finding of no damages in the case of the
death of an incurable mentally defective infant, the court concluded:
We see no basis for holding that the jury subverted its duty under the evi-
dence or failed to follow instructions. The proof of pecuniary loss is too
anemic and speculative for us to say as a matter of law that the $2000 is
inadequate to compensate for the reasonably expected pecuniary loss. 4 2
Justice Craven, in a ringing dissent, while admitting the sparse
nature of the evidence presented by plaintiff to substantiate the pre-
sumption, admonished the majority for failing to take judicial notice
of decedent's life expectancy for purposes of computing a more real-
istic pecuniary loss amount:
The judgment in this case is inadequate not because of a rejection of the
presumption, but because the affirmative evidence, even if not presented in
model form, commands a higher verdict. The decedent's life expectancy
was not established; however, the decedent was shown to be in good health,
was employable, and this court can, as the defendant candidly conceded at
oral argument, take note of a life expectancy that clearly shows this award
to be inadequate as a matter of law.4a
The decision was especially unfortunate, Justice Craven continued,
40. Id. at 148, 310 N.E.2d at 817.
41. 89 Ill. App. 2d 368, 232 N.E.2d 473 (3d Dist. 1967).
42. 19 Il. App. 3d at 149, 310 N.E.2d at 817.
43. 1d. at 150, 310 N.E.2d at 818.
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in light of the expanded scope of recovery afforded the family unit
in Murphy v. Martin Oil Co.44
The final decision noted above, Mattyasovsky v. West Towns
Bus Co.," discussed the propriety of an award of $75,000 for the
death of a twelve year old decedent, in light of defendant's claim
that it was excessive as a matter of law. The evidence in support
of the presumption of substantial pecuniary loss was that the dece-
dent did all family outdoor maintenance chores, repaired watches and
television sets, had a paper route, paid for his own clothes, planned
to attend college, and after graduation, help finance the education
of his younger brothers and sisters.
The court, again noting the presumption of substantial pecuniary
loss, affirmed the award as being within the permissible range and,
hence, not resulting from "passion and prejudice" of the jury, which
is the conceptual basis for the reduction of jury verdict awards by
an appellate court.46
The rationale of the early common law in disallowing actions for
death, that any attempt to put a price tag on a human life would
be sheer speculation and reduce human beings to the status of prop-
erty, was rejected by nineteenth century legislatures. By employing
the economic concept of loss of support to the surviving family and
by courts refining the mechanics of proof regarding it, the earlier
fears of speculation were allayed. However, in jurisdictions such as
Illinois, which allow for the presumption of substantial pecuniary loss
in cases of the death of minor lineals, -the bankruptcy of the pecuni-
ary loss concept is demonstrated.
When the evidence of actual pecuniary loss is sparse indeed and
the financial realities of the liability status of children and the min-
imal supportive assistance given parents by emancipated children is
ignored as in most cases, the pecuniary loss concept must simply al-
low recovery for the stunning loss of a child to the family unit. The
absence of an alternative conceptual basis for recognition of familial
losses in this regard will necessitate the continuance of the current
inconsistent and anomalous results in this area.
44. 56 Ill. 2d 423, 308 N.E.2d 583 (1974).
45. 21 Ill. App. 3d 46, 313 N.E.2d 496 (2d Dist. 1974).




As mentioned above, awards for death are solely the result of stat-
utory enactments. In actions against a tavern keeper, there is no
recovery for death or personal injuries received at the hands of an
intoxicant outside of a statute. The Illinois Dram Shop Act 7 is the
exclusive remedy, the common law having established early that the
concepts of lack of duty or proximate cause insulated the dram shop
keeper from liability for injury or death caused by the intoxicated
customer.4" The Act, in section 135, delineates the parameters of
the exclusive statutory remedy, which provides for three basic areas
of recovery:
1. An action for personal injuries and/or property damage for a
third party injured by the intoxicant.
2. An action for loss of or injury to the means of support by the
family of a third party victim due to the death or injury of
the family member.
3. An action for loss of or injury to means of support by the
family of the intoxicant due to death, injury or incapacitation
due to intoxication.
Five recent decisions merit attention at this point inasmuch as they
shed light on the finer points of an action for injury or death initiated
under the Dram Shop Act. Weiner v. Trasatti49 and Caruso v. Ka-
zense5° discuss the nature of the concept "loss of means of support"
and the liability of contributing dram shops under the Act. Wendt
v. Richter5 and Harden v. Desideri52 analyze the extent of statutory
responsibility of "owners," who have the beneficial interest in a land
trust that includes a dram shop. Finally, American National Bank
v. Wisniewski53 considers the propriety of certain action taken to
47. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1973).
48. See, e.g., Graham v. General Ulysses S. Grant Post No. 2665, V.F.W., 43
Ill. 2d 1, 248 N.E.2d 657 (1969), and cases cited therein.
49. 19 IlI. App. 3d 240, 311 N.E.2d 313 (1st Dist. 1974).
50. 20 Ill. App. 3d 695, 313 N.E.2d 689 (3d Dist. 1974).
51. 17 Ill. App. 3d 230, 307 N.E.2d 756 (Ist Dist. 1974).
52. 20 Il1. App. 3d 590, 315 N.E.2d 235 (1st Dist. 1974).
53. 18 111. App. 3d 961, 310 N.E.2d 834 (1st Dist. 1974).
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maximize recovery under the Act to avoid to some extent its damage
limitation section."
In Trasatti, an action was brought by the decedent's husband for
loss of means of support damages due to his wife's death in an auto
collision involving an individual who allegedly became intoxicated
on defendant's premises. After discussing the nature of intoxication
under the Act 5 and the fact that mere evidence of consumption of
alcohol was insufficient to raise a jury question in that regard, 5" the
court addressed the damage issue.
Evidence was -presented that the decedent was separately em-
ployed and contributed her time and income to the family business.
Since there is no presumption of any loss of means of support under
the Dram Shop Act, the court held it a jury question as to whether
Mr. Weiner in fact lost "support" and set out the items includable
within that concept:
Means of support include all those resources from which the necessities and
comforts of living are or may be supplied. [citations omitted]. The ca-
pacity for providing means of support may be shown by proof of earnings
and contribution of services or income. 57
In cases of the loss of a wife, as in the case at bar, the court con-
tinued:
The services of a wife to which a husband is entitled include those rendered
by the wife in performance of her household and domestic duties, as well as
those rendered by her while assisting the husband in his business.58
Thus, while the Wrongful Death Act's presumption of loss is absent
in the Dram Shop Act and the terminology differs, i.e., "injury to
means of support" as opposed to "pecuniary loss," the nature of the
54. The act limits recovery for injury to the person or property to $15,000, and
actions for loss of means of support to $20,000. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135
(1973).
55. 19 Ill. App. 3d at 243-44, 311 N.E.2d at 317.
56. [P]roof of intoxication in a dram shop suit requires evidence which
establishes that the person involved was in fact intoxicated. It is not
enough that the evidence prove only that the alleged intoxicated person con-
sumed alcohol .... However, evidence that the alleged intoxicated person
consumed alcoholic liquor, together with evidence of unusual behavior or
opinion evidence that he was drunk, would entitle a jury, under such circum-
stances, to conclude that the person was intoxicated.
Id. at 244, 311 N.E.2d at 317.
57. Id. at 246, 311 N.E.2d at 319.
58. Id,
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loss and the mechanics of proof are essentially the same in both
actions.
As to the liability of the dram shop operator, a 1971 amendment
to the Act removed the words "in whole or part" so that currently,
statutory liability is to be imposed only upon the person who caused
the intoxication rather than those who merely contributed to the
eventual intoxication. This language change supposedly eliminates
as proper parties defendant dramshop keepers who have been re-
ferred to as "spree" defendants. The third appellate district, in the
case of Caruso v. Kazense,5 9 analyzed the actual effect of 'the amend-
ment in a setting where the intoxicant arrived at defendant's prem-
ises in a clear state of intoxication.
The action was brought by the wife of the intoxicant for injury
to her means of support. After drinking heavily for a twelve hour
period in one tavern, the intoxicant arrived at the defendant's estab-
lishment, where he consumed several additional drinks before leav-
ing and receiving injuries as a result of losing control of his vehicle.
The defendant, arguing -that intoxication occurred prior to entry on
his premises, received a jury verdict in his favor, which was ap-
pealed.
The court, after upholding the propriety of the trial court's sub-
mission of the issue to the jury, indicated the questionable nature
of the alleged aid given contributing tavern keepers by 'the 1971
amendment. It was apparent, the court stated, that the recent stat-
utory change had limited the applicability of the act, since by its
terms it only applied to those dram shops which "cause" the intoxica-
tion that results in injury or death. However, the court continued:
The phrase, "causes the intoxication" is not a technical legal term requiring
definition.. We note that IPI 150 et seq. (2d ed.) does not define the term.
In the case at bar we believe that the question of whether the intoxication
was the result of the serving of liquor by defendants was a question of fact
for the jury. 60
Thus, while on the facts of this case the contributing tavern keeper
escaped liability, the court's technical holding relative to the meaning
of "cause," gives little comfort to dram shop keepers who in fact,
contribute to intoxication in "whole or in part."
59. 20 Ill. App. 3d 695, 313 N.E.2d 689 (3d Dist. 1974).
60. Id. at 697, 313 N.E.2d at 691.
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On the issue of who is a proper party defendant in a dram shop
case, the first appellate district, in the case of Wendt v. Richter,"'
has held that the beneficiary under a land trust is to be included
within the statutory roll of "[a]ny person owning, renting, leasing
or permitting the occupation of any building or premises with knowl-
edge that alcoholic liquors are to be sold therein ... .
The plaintiff, administratrix of her husband's estate, brought ac-
tion against the dram shop operator and the trustee bank for injury
to her means of support resulting from her husband's death from
a fall down a flight of stairs while intoxicated. Upon motion, the
trustee was dismissed as only holding bare legal title and the land
trust beneficiary was added as a party defendant. The defendant
beneficiary was successful, however, on her motion for summary
judgment.
The defendant argued that because she contracted to sell the
premises under articles of agreement for warranty deed, she retained
no real control over the building other than the traditional security
measures of prohibition against lien attachments, consent for all al-
terations, and retention of all title and interest until transfer of title
upon full payment under the land contract. Accordingly, the pur-
pose of the Act in making owners responsible because of their ability
to control activities on the premises had no application to her situa-
tion.
The court, after an examination of the purposes of the Act, re-
jected defendant's argument, stating:
In Illinois there is no uniform meaning to the term "owner," and considera-
tion must be given to the nature and purpose of the statute involved ...
The defendant . . . did not divest herself of her equitable title by entering
into the agreement. The defendant retained sufficient control of the prem-
ises in question to be held liable as an "owner" under the Dram Shop Act.
Holding the defendant liable will provide "discipline of traffic in liquor" and
will serve the purpose of the Dram Shop Act. 63
In Harden v. Desideri64 another case involving an "owner" who
was the beneficiary of a land trust, the question of the availability
61. 17 I11. App. 3d 230, 307 N.E.2d 756 (1st Dist. 1974).
62. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1973).
63. 17 Ill. App. 3d at 232, 307 N.E.2d at 758.
64. 20 111. App. 3d 590, 315 N.E.2d 235 (1st Dist. 1974).
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of common law indemnity by such owner from the operator-lessee
was discussed. The plaintiffs were successor beneficiaries of a land
trust covering premises upon which the defendant lessee operated
a tavern. A dram shop action which led to an eventual settlement
paid by the plaintiffs was brought against both parties by a patron
injured by another intoxicated patron. The plaintiffs brought the
instant action against the lessee seeking indemnity.
In count I, the plaintiffs sought reformation of an indemnity
agreement entered into by defendant stating that he would indem-
nify the "lessor" against all judgments paid pursuant to the Dram
Shop Act. Reformation was sought because the trustee was mistak-
enly listed as the lessor. Count II sought common law indemnity
on the basis that the defendant's actual sale of the liquor was "active"
conduct, whereas plaintiffs' mere ownership was "passive" conduct.
After a lengthy analysis of the law of reformation65 and holding the
trial court's refusal to grant it to be error, the court addressed the
common law indemnity issue.
There is a basic distinction, the court noted, between common law
negligence actions and actions brought pursuant to the Act in that
there is no common law action maintainable against either owner
or operator. Since the sole basis for recovery in this area is stat-
utory, the court held:
Under the statute, both the owner of the premises and the seller of intoxi-
cating liquors thereon are jointly and severally liable, and the statute makes
no qualitative distinction between the actions of owning and serving. If
one's conduct falls within the provisions of the statute, he must be con-
sidered an active wrongdoer under that statute, regardless of the compara-
tive passive nature of that conduct relative to the conduct of another stat-
tory obligor. 66
Since in the instant case both plaintiff and defendant were statutory
tortfeasors, they were both "active" wrongdoers, thus eliminating the
conceptual basis for common law indemnity.
Aside from the above considerations, the court also noted the
recent Illinois Supreme Court decision in the case of Wessel v. Carmi
Elks Home, Inc.,61 which held, on the same basic rationale, that an
65. Id. at 596-601, 315 N.E.2d at 240-43. This portion is suggested for reading
for both law and fact.
66. Id. at 601, 315 N.E.2d at 243.
67. 54 Ill. 2d 127, 295 N.E.2d 718 (1973).
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"owner" within the Act could not receive common law indemnity
from the intoxicant. While noting the 'limited factual setting of
Carmi Elks Home, the court could see no justification for not apply-
ing the same reasoning to the case of "owner" versus "operator."
While the court did not discuss the propriety of the "owners" es-
caping ultimate financial responsibility by way of contractual indem-
nity, it appears to be only a matter of time before that liability shield
is severely dented or pierced. The Desideri decision, -along with the
others discussed above, is a further indication of the tenacity with
which Illinois courts resist argument of counsel who seek to minimize
statutory responsibility under the Dram Shop Act.
In a final unique dram shop decision, dealing with the statutory
damage limitation, 6 the first appellate district, in American National
Bank v. Wisniewski69 discussed the effect of a probate court's al-
location of funds received from the carrier of the intoxicant in a prior
suit, on the maximization of damages under the Act. As the result
of an auto collision, Kamil Brazda and his son Roy were killed and
his two minor children, Larry and Marcia, received personal injuries.
Subsequently, due to her grief over the loss, the mother, Florence
Brazda, committed suicide. The plaintiff, :as administrator of the
estates of ithe parents and son, brought a diversity action in federal
court against the intoxicated driver of the other vehicle for the
wrongful deaths and for the injuries to the children. Judgment by
stipulation was entered, with $31,875 going to the estate of the
father, $20,000 to the estate of the mother, $8,000 to that of the
son and $1,000 each to the minor children.
The intoxicant's carrier paid in the sum of $21,875, the extent
of its contractual obligation, in one lump sum. Counsel for plain-
tiff then successfully petitioned the probate court to allocate the
funds so that only $1,875, representing property damage, went to the
estate of the father. Hence, on the probate books of account, no
funds representing pecuniary loss inured to the children from the
estate of the father.
A successful dram shop action for loss of means of support of the
children was brought against the tavern where the driver became
68. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1973).
69. 18 IIl. App. 3d 961, 310 N.E.2d 834 (Ist Dist. 1974).
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intoxicated; the jury awarding the litigants the statutory maximum
of $20,000.70 The defendant sought a nullification of the award by
arguing that he should receive a credit for the total monies received
in the earlier federal court action against the driver, arguing that
otherwise, the plaintiffs would get double recovery.
On appeal, the court, while agreeing that defendants in dram shop
cases are entitled to credit in the amount of any sums paid by co-
wrongdoers in return for covenants not to sue, 71 rejected the de-
fendant's double recovery argument. The defendant asserted that
the court should adopt a "per beneficial" plaintiff approach as op-
posed to the "per cause of action" position urged by the plaintiff
bank. In effect the court stated that the defendant was seeking a type
of equitable apportionment, cutting across the lines of clearly sep-
arate causes of action. The defendant was not entitled to credit for
funds allocated by the probate court to the estates of Florence and
Roy, since no recovery was sought or received on their estate's be-
half in the instant action.
While noting plaintiff's concession that the sole purpose of the
probate court allocation was to maximize recovery in the dram shop
action and the fact that defendants would have little opportunity to
challenge it, the court held:
We see nothing improper on the state of this record with regard to the
probate court's allocation of the recovery from the suit in Federal court to
the various estates in order to permit maximum recovery in this dram shop
action. . . . No case on point as to the propriety of this allocation in re-
spect of its impact on defendants has been cited to us, and our research has
disclosed none. . . . The fact remains that plaintiffs have received no
double recovery for any single cause of action. 7 2
While the propriety of the above action with respect to defend-
ant's position and the principle of one satisfaction for one injury both
appear questionable, the case serves as further evidence of the
strong position taken by Illinois courts towards -the furtherance of
the purpose of the Dram Shop Act.
70. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1973).
71. A second tavern had been dismissed from the action after paying $2,500 for
a covenant not to sue.
72. 18 Ill. App. 3d at 969, 310 N.E.2d at 840. The closest analogy the court
could find was the right of a debtor, subject to the laws of bankruptcy, to prefer one




Only one case decided during this past year addresses itself to the
issue of the proper valuation of loss model to be utilized in instances
of damage to personal property. The first appellate district, in the
case of Kroch's & Brentano's, Inc. v. Barber-Colman Co.,78 misap-
plied the relevant law by confusing the valuation of loss model ap-
propriate to injury to improvements on realty with that relating to
personal property damage per se.
In Barber-Colman, several retail businesses sued the defendant
for water damage resulting from the alleged negligent installation
of a central air-conditioning unit which had caused extensive prop-
erty damage when it malfunctioned. At trial, one plaintiff called
as an expert witness an experienced insurance adjustor, who at-
tempted to testify only as to the reasonable cost of repairing the dam-
aged items. The defendant objected to the proffered testimony on
the basis that it did not seek to establish the reasonable market value
of the items immediately prior to the injury. The objection was sus-
tained and a directed verdict eventually was entered in defendant's
favor.
On appeal by plaintiffs, the court, relying on the cases of Behrens
v. W. S. Bills & Sons, Inc.74 and Lucas v. Bowman Dairy Co.,75 made
a distinction between repairable or non-repairable damaged person-
alty which is the determinant of the necessity for "value before"
testimony in property damage cases.
In Bowman Dairy, the court had held that in a suit to recover dam-
ages to personal property that is unrepairable or treated as unre-
pairable, the measure of damages is the difference between the
value of the personalty immediately before and the value immedi-
ately after the injury. Since the diminution in value is the limit of
recovery in such cases, testimony of "value before" is essential.
However, Justice Leighton, while holding the exclusion of the ex-
pert in the instant case to be error, stated that if damaged personalty
is repairable, the proper damage measure is the reasonable cost of
73. 16 11. App. 3d 412, 306 N.E.2d 522 (1st Dist. 1974).
74. 5 Ill. App. 3d 567, 283 N.E.2d I (3d Dist. 1972).
75. 50 I11. App. 2d 413, 200 N.E.2d 374 (1st Dist. 1964).
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repairs plus the difference in value, if the value after repairs is less
than the value before the damage. "He was not testifying about
nonrepairable personalty; consequently, he did not have to know
their condition and value before the occurence that caused dam-
age.""6  While the court's statement of the law, as far as it goes,
is correct, it omitted consideration of the factor setting the outside
limit on recovery for damage to personal property-the diminution
in value due to the injury.
Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction 30.10, reflecting a series of Illinois
decisions 77 and the majority position in the United States, 78 provides
that in all cases of personal property damage, except in cases of in-
jury to improvements on real estate, the following valuation of loss
model is to be utilized:
30.10 Measure of Damages-Damage to Personal Property-
Repairs and Depreciation or Difference in Value
Before and After Damage
As to property damage, you may award the lesser of two figures only, which
are arrived at as follows:
One figure is the reasonable expense of necessary repair of the property
plus the difference between the fair market value of the property immedi-
ately before the occurrence and its fair market value after the property is re-
paired. The other figure is the difference between the fair market value of
the property immediately before the occurrence and the fair market value
of the unrepaired property immediately after the occurrence.
You may award as damages the lesser of these two figures only.79
The comments following the above emphasize the limiting factor of
diminution in value:
Since compensatory damages are only to make a party whole, and not to
enable him to make a profit on the transaction, a party may recover the
reasonable expense of necessary repairs plus any difference between the
value of the property immediately before the occurrence and after it has
been repaired, provided that these amounts do not exceed the difference be-
tween the value of the undamaged and damaged property.80
76. 16 Ill. App. 3d at 416, 306 N.E.2d at 525.
77. See, e.g., Santiemmo v. Days Transfer, Inc., 9 ill. App. 2d 487, 133 N.E.2d
539 (Ist Dist. 1956); Welter v. Schell, 252 Ill. App. 586 (1st Dist. 1929); McDonell
v. Lake Erie & W. Ry., 208 Ill. App. 442 (2d Dist. 1917).
78. See, e.g., ERA Helicopters, Inc. v. Digicon Alaska, Inc., 518 P.2d 1057 (Alas.
1974); State v. Stanley, 506 P.2d 1284 (Alas. 1973); Bridgeforth v. Proffitt, 490
S.W.2d 416 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973). See also D. DoBBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
REMEDIES 355 et seq. (1973).
79. IPI 2d, § 30.10.
80. Id.
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While, as noted in a recent federal decision, Indiana Harbor Belt
Railroad Co. v. Soo Line Railroad Co.,"' Illinois law is inconsistent
with respect to the damage equations for injury to realty and injuries
to structures on realty, a firm exception to the diminution limit is
made in the latter. In such cases the measure of damages is the
cost of repairs regardless of the fact that such may exceed the diminu-
tion figure. As stated in Kremeyer v. Shumate,"2 an earlier Illinois
decision:
There has been no holding of any court in this jurisdiction that has been
cited to us that the measure of damages for injury to improvements on real
estate is the lesser sum of the difference in value immediately before and
immediately after the injury, or the cost of repair. This is the rule for per-
sonal property .... 83
Hence, it is submitted, that the court in Barber-Colman misstated
applicable Illinois law in holding "value before" testimony to be un-
necessary.
Interference with Personalty: Replevin and Conversion
In the case of S. T. Enterprises, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,4 the
Illinois Supreme Court analyzed the nature of the common law
remedy of replevin as enacted in statutory form in the Illinois Reple-
vin Act 5 and the relationship between it and the common law rem-
edy of trover for conversion of personalty. The Brunswick Corpora-
tion, under a conditional sales contract, sold $610,000 worth of bowl-
nig equipment to Thunderbird Bowl, Inc. Through subsequent as-
signments, made with Brunswick's consent, interest in the equip-
ment passed to Pala Inc. and then to the LaSalle National Bank as
trustee for several individual beneficiaries. Payments by the re-
sponsible parties were suddenly discontinued, leaving an unpaid
balance of $379,190.
The above parties filed a three count complaint against Brunswick
seeking fraud damages, reformation, and damages for breach of war-
ranty. These actions were consolidated with Brunswick's action
81. 365 F. Supp. 867 (N.D. I1. 1973).
82. 20 Il1. App. 2d 542, 156 N.E.2d 271 (2d Dist. 1959).
83. Id. at 546, 156 N.E.2d at 274.
84. 57 Il1. 2d 461, 315 N.E.2d 1 (1974).
$5. ILL. Rlnv. STAT, Ch. 119, §§ 1-28 (1973).
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seeking a writ of replevin, a deficiency judgment, and damages for
wrongful detention of the equipment.8 6 During the pendency of the
above actions the trust beneficiaries sold the equipment to S. T.
Enterprises, subject to any defect in their title.
. Brunswick was successful, receiving an order awarding possession,
a deficiency judgment against Thunderbird for $431,187,7 an award
of $157,456 for wrongful detention, and $10,000 in attorneys fees.
For purposes of the statutory double value bonding provisions,
Brunswick, in its replevin affidavit, stated the current value of the
disputed equipment to be $74,000.
S. T. Enterprises, obtained a -temporary injunction restraining
Brunswick from seizing the equipment due to the alleged hardship
it would work on them. The order made no mention of S. T.'s offer
to purchase the equipment from Brunswick at its stated current value
of $74,000.
On appeal, the appellate court 8 reduced the judgment for wrong-
ful detention to $18,243, representing the interest on the stated
current value for the period of detention, gave the party in posses-
sion, Pala Inc., the option of retaining possession upon payment of
the current value, and affirmed the injunctive order. Brunswick ar-
gued that both the Uniform Commercial Code,' with regard to non-
judicial repossession and the Replevin Act, gave it the unqualified
right to possession of the goods.
The Illinois Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Golden-
hersh, began by stating the parameters of the Replevin Act, with
respect to the common law remedies of trover and replevin:
The primary purpose of the Replevin Act is to test the right to possession of
personal property and place the successful party in possession. . . . Section
18 of the Act. .. provides that when the property cannot be found or de-
livered, the plaintiff may proceed under the original or amended complaint
for the value of the property not found or delivered. This alternative rem-
edy was formerly identified "as in an action of trover." The measure of
86. Brunswick's demand on defendants for non-judicial repossession pursuant to
Section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code was refused by the defendants.
87. The order provided for a reduction in the amount of the deficiency judgment
for monies received upon resale.
88. S.T. Enterprises, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 10 Ill. App. 3d 705, 294 N.E.2d
722 (1st Dist. 1973).
89. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 26, § 9-503 (1973).
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damages in trover is the market value of the property at the time of con-
version with interest from that time. 90
The court noted its earlier decision in the case of Keho v. Rounds,9
wherein it was held that no authority existed under the Act for a court
to render judgment for the value of the property, as in trover, except
in cases where the officer was unable to procure it pursuant to the
writ of replevin. Since the goods here were located, it was error
to give the party in possession the option of retention upon payment
of the market value.
After affirming the reduction of the wrongful detention award, the
court addressed S. T.'s argument that the Replevin Act itself pre-
cluded seizure since the writ is executed when the party in posses-
sion posts the double value replevin bond. If possession is refused,
the plaintiff is limited to an action for the bond proceeds. In reject-
ing this position, the court noted the clear wording of section 14 of
the Act92 and stated:
mhe losing party does not have the option of keeping the property and
forcing the successful party to accept the value of the property or seek re-
course to an action on the replevin bond ...
Neither the plaintiffs nor S.T. has cited authority which holds that after
default under a conditional-sale contract, the buyer or his successor in in-
terest may be permitted to flaunt the provisions for repossession, keep the
property covered by the contract and pay only its alleged value at the time
of default on the contract, a value which is considerably less than the bal-
ance due on the contract price.93
Injury to Realty: Lost Profits
In a unique opinion, the first appellate district addressed the issue
of the proper valuation of loss model to be utilized in instances of
damage to improvements on realty. The opinion merits attention
because a question was raised as to the rights of a holder of a delin-
quent tax certificate during the two year statutory redemption
period.
In Schwartz v. City of Chicago,4 the purchasers of a statutory tax
90. 57 I11. 2d at 469-70, 315 N.E.2d at 6.
91. 69 I11. 351 (1873).
92. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 119, § 14 (1973).
93. 57 I11. 2d at 473-74, 315 N.E.2d at 8.
94. 21 Ill. App. 3d 84, 315 N.E. d 215 (Ist Dist, 1974).
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certificate brought an action for damages due to the alleged negli-
gence of the city in failing to notify them of the scheduled demolition
of the apartment building covered by the certificate. After dispens-
ing with several issues concerning plaintiffs' interest in the building
and their possible election of a binding remedy by receiving a stat-
utory refund of their certificate purchase price,95 the court addressed
the issue of damages. After noting that in cases of irreparable dam-
age to improvements on realty the measure of damages is the dif-
ference in market value of the premises before and after the injury,96
the court responded to plaintiffs' "value before" argument that it was
entitled to the profits lost due to the demolition.
Plaintiffs, in purchasing the tax certificate in 1966 for $6,184, es-
timated the building's value to be $30,000, based upon capitalization
of the rental income flow, with allowance for $5,000 for repairs re-
quired to bring the building up to housing code standards. In reject-
ing plaintiffs' "value before" position, the court stressed that the ac-
tual basis for plaintiff's claim was one for lost profits and stated:
Lost profits as an element of damage must be the necessary and natural
consequence of the injurious act. They are compensable only so far as they
are plainly traceable to it, and may not be recovered when they are merely
probable and speculative. 97
In this instance, especially in light of plaintiffs' own testimony that
due to substantial vandalism and increased deterioration during the
redemption period, a decision had been made not to eventually pur-
chase a tax deed, the court found plaintiffs' "value before" argument
sadly wanting:
[I]t stretches credulity to consider that the building could reasonably have
been expected to remain in a static condition for the ensuing two-year pe-
riod of redemption. . . . Hence for [plaintiff] to rely on continuation of
the same income as then received, and to anticipate no further deterioration
in the premises, seems wholly unwarranted. This inference becomes ines-
capable when it is recalled that condemnation proceedings were launched
only four months after the tax sale. 98
Having rejected plaintiffs' suggested "lost profits" valuation
95. See discussion at pp. 318-19 infra, as to these aspects of the decision. See
also ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, § 734a (1973).
96. See discussion at pp. 292-94 supra.
97. 21111. App. 3d at 95, 315 N.E.2d at 224.
98. Id. at 95, 315 N.E.2d at 225.
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model, it still remained for the court to delineate the extent of dam-
age recovery in this specialized context. The court noted that al-
though a tax certificate purchaser is not entitled to redemption from
any person other than private parties who are eligible to redeem,
the redemption and penalty payments equal the maximum value to
him of his certificate from the date of purchase until the redemption
period expires and a tax deed is issued.
The mere expectancy of acquiring title and possession of the
premises was deemed the "essence" of what was meant by unre-
coverable speculative lost profits. Accordingly, the court constructed
the following valuation of loss model in this hybrid "ownership"
setting:
We have determined that the maximum entitlement of certificate holders
to money damages for injury to their investment value occurring during the
redemption period must be limited to an amount equal to the price of re-
demption.99
Since in the instant case, plaintiffs had received a refund of their
certificate purchase price pursuant to statutory provision for "sales
in error," 00 the amount of damages would be limited to all or part
of the penalty payment available to them upon redemption.
Interest on Judgments
Effective August 29, 1969, section 3 of the Illinois Interest Act''
was amended to increase the interest rate on outstanding judgments
from five to six percent. In the case of Noe v. City of Chicago,'°2
the Illinois Supreme Court held the increased rate apphicable, on that
date, to unsatisfied judgments entered prior to the effective date of
the amendment.
Plaintiff Noe and Bogoff, an intervenor, after refusing tender of
satisfaction of judgments under the five percent rate, brought an ac-
tion in equity requesting the court to order the city to pay interest
on all unsatisfied judgments entered before August 29, 1969, at the
rate of five percent up to that date and thereafter at the increased
rate.
99. Id. at 96, 315 N.E.2d at 225-26.
100. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, § 741 (1973).
101. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 74, § 3 (1973).
102. 56 Ill. 2d 346, 307 N.E.2d 376 (1974).
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Preliminary to its decision, the court, speaking through Justice
Ward, noted the division in authority on the effect of a statutory
change in interest rates upon outstanding judgments. While one
view sees a judgment as a contract which accordingly fixes the rights
of the parties upon entry, 03 other jurisdictions deem interest as
solely available under statute and, hence, interest should be com-
puted per the varying statutory rates in existence during the period
that the judgment remains unsatisfied. 04
While the Illinois Supreme Court had not passed on the precise
issue before it, Justice Ward noted the court's earlier statement in
Firemen's Fund Insurance Co. v. Western Refrigerating Co.,"°5
holding the current statutory interest rate applicable to a note when
no rate was specified therein. In Western Refrigerating, the court
based its ruling on the fact that interest, being unavailable at com-
mon law, was strictly the creature of statute, which could be altered
at any time.
The court in Noe, accepting the above rationale, stated:
We consider that the holdings that judgment is a contract or in the nature
of a contract are forced and unrealistic. To be preferred are the holdings
that interest on a judgment arises from a statute's operation and not from
any contract or other agreement of the parties. 106
In response to the defendant's argument that the application of the
increased rate to judgments entered prior to the effective date of
the amendment would amount to a retroactive enforcement, the
court stated:
Rather, under our holding there is a prospective application of the new in-
terest rate from the effective date of the amendment. Interest is purely a
statutory creation. . . . The legislature may increase, decrease or eliminate
the statutory interest rate as long as it does not interfere with rights which
have already accrued and vested under a previous statutory rate.' 07
103. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Heersche, 209 Kan. 369, 496 P.2d 1314 (1972); Parish
of East Baton Rouge v. Harrison, 260 So. 2d 106 (La. Ct. App. 1972).
104. See, e.g., Morley v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry., 146 U.S. 162 (1892); Idaho
Gold Dredging Corp. v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 54 Idaho 765, 37 P.2d 407
(1934); Yamamoto v. Costello, 73 Misc. 2d 592, 342 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1973); People
ex rel. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co. v. Miller, 173 Misc. 397, 17 N.Y.S.2d 202
(1939); Swanson v. Flynn, 75 N.D. 597, 31 N.W.2d 320 (1948).
105. 162 I11. 322, 44 N.E. 746 (1896).
106. 56 Ill. 2d at 349, 307 N.E.2d at 379.
107. Id. at 350, 307 N.E.2d at 379.
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Accordingly, the court held, on the effective date of the amendment
the plaintiffs became entitled to the increased interest rate on their
respective unsatisfied judgments.
Im. EQUITY
Restitution: The Constructive Trust
The action seeking restitution in equity of monies or property held
by a wrongdoer to avoid his unjust enrichment, one of the several
historical mainstays of equity jurisprudence, has had continued utility
in a wide variety of social conflict settings. The traditional means
of effecting restitution has been to seek the imposition of a "con-
structive" trust on the subject matter of the dispute, upon a showing
of fraud or the abuse of a fiduciary relationship, with an accompany.
ing order of reconveyance or transfer of the disputed proceeds to
the plaintiff. By analogizing to actual, formal trusts, and treating
,the wrongdoer as a "trustee" holding the trust "corpus" for the plain-
tiff "beneficiary," the courts can effectively eliminate the vestiges of
unjust enrichment in an orderly and conceptually familiar fashion.
To assist the court in locating and identifying the disputed pro-
ceeds in instances of complex non-realty related matters, the tech-
nique of equitable accounting is utilized. The accounting serves to
establish the degree of unjust enrichment in cases of the transfer
or alteration of proceeds and, by the use of the further technique
of "tracing," helps locate the "corpus" in instances of sale or other
disbursements of the disputed assets.""8 In some instances, a re-
ceiver is appointed by the court to preserve the disputed assets pend-
ing resolution of the disputed matters.
The constructive trust, the major equitable conceptual tool utilized
to effect restitution, has suffered much criticism, being referred to
as a "shambling creature" 0 9 due to its seemingly unlimited use and
the absence of a sufficiently clear definitional base. Three recent
Illinois decisions merit attention at this point because of their analysis
of the prerequisites for the imposition of a constructive trust and be-
cause of the light they shed in the shadowy parameters of the concept
of fiduciary relationships.
108. See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 78, at 240-77.
109. J. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 33 (1951).
300 [V/ol. 24:274
In the case of Williams v. Teachers Insurance and Annuity Associ-
ation,110 the first appellate district delineated the often misunder-
stood distinctions between express, resulting, and constructive trusts.
Plaintiff, the alleged common law spouse of a decedent covered by
one of defendant's policies, sought the imposition of a constructive
trust on the proceeds of the policy to prevent their receipt by the
named beneficiary, decedent's mother. After reviewing plaintiff's
evidence regarding her relationship with the decedent and his al-
leged intention to name her the beneficiary, the court addressed it-
self to the bases of the several constructive trust theories underlying
plaintiff's claim.
Noting that all trusts are either express (actual formal trusts) or
implied in law, the court analyzed the conceptual differences be-
tween pure constructive trusts and resulting trusts. While both of
the latter types are implied in law, resulting trusts, where proof of
the actual intent of the parties is available, are deemed to "result"
constructively, according to those stated terms, even though the fac-
tors were insufficient to create an express formal trust under the
generally accepted criteria of trust law.
A pure constructive trust, on the other hand, where evidence of
the intent of the parties relative to the disposition of the trust
"corpus" is absent, requires judicial construction of the parameters
of the "trust" agreement based upon the facts and equities of the
case at bar:
A constructive trust arises when advantage is taken of a fiduciary rela-
tionship by the dominant party or when fraud is proven. ...
A resulting trust arises from the presumed intent of the parties. 11
Due to the absence of proof establishing the requisites of either type
of implied in law trusts and the strength of the contractual benefici-
ary designation, the trial court's order imposing the trust was re-
versed.
In light of the nature of the fiduciary relationship, the abuse of
which is the main basis for the imposition of a constructive trust,
the Illinois Supreme Court, in the earlier decision of Warren v.
Pfeil,"2 discussed the conceptual limits of the relationship:
110. 15 Ill. App. 3d 542, 304 N.E.2d 656 (1st Dist. 1973).
111. Id. at 546-47, 304 N.E.2d at 659-60.
112. 346 Il. 344, 178 N.E. 894 (1931).
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A fiduciary relationship is not limited to cases of trustee and cestul que
trust, guardian and ward, attorney and client, and other recognized legal re-
lationships, but extends to every possible case in which there is confidence
reposed on one side and a resulting superiority and domination on the
other. The origin of the confidence may be moral, social, domestic or
merely personal. If the confidence in fact exists and is reposed by one
party and accepted by the other the relation is fiduciary and equity will re-
gard dealings between the parties according to the rules which apply to such
relation.113
The above guidelines aiding in determining the existence of a re-
lationship sufficient to warrant the imposition of a constructive trust
to effect restitution are vague, to say the least. However, Illinois
law has long held that the existence of such relationship must be
shown by proof "so clear and convincing, so strong, and unequivocal
and unmistaking [sic] that it leads to only one conclusion." '114 In
addition, the proof must establish, to the same degree of conclusive-
ness, domination or influence improperly exercised by the other
party to the relationship." 5
In the highly publicized case of Ware v. D.R.G., Inc.," ,the first
appellate district, while not clarifying to any great degree the murky
requirements for the finding of a fiduciary relationship, did analyze
the outer limits of the concept in the course of analyzing plaintiff's
novel use of the constructive trust device.
The plaintiff, as a result of failure to pay a $41.57 special assess-
ment, lost title to her $25,000 home due to the purchase of a stat-
utory tax certificate by the defendant and the eventual issuance to
the defendant of a tax deed after expiration of the statutory redemp-
tion period. The defendant adhered to all statutory notice require-
ments in the redemption period. The plaintiff sought and received
the imposition of a constructive trust on the home and an order or
reconveyance to her due to the unjust enrichment of defendant
arising out of the breach of a fiduciary relationship between them.
On appeal by the defendant, the court raised three questions
113. Id. at 360, 178 N.E. at 900.
114. See In re Estate of Nelson, 132 Ill. App. 2d 544, 551, 270 N.E.2d 65, 70
(1st Dist. 1971). See also Durkee v. Franklin Say. Ass'n, 17 Ill. App. 3d 978, 309
N.E.2d 118 (2d Dist. 1974).
115. See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Atkins, 387 Il. 360, 56 N.E.2d 770 (1944); Durkee
v. Franklin Say. Ass'n, 17 Ill. App. 3d 978, 309 N.E.2d 118 (2d Dist. 1974).
116. 17 Ill. App. 3d 758, 307 N.E.2d 740 (1st Dist. 1974).
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deemed determinative of the sufficiency of plaintiff's restitutional
theory: (1) In whom was trust and confidence reposed? (2) What
was the nature of the trust and confidence so reposed? and, (3)
Was such confidence accepted by defendant?
As to the first inquiry, plaintiff's argument that confidence was
resposed in all those individuals and corporations, including the de-
fendant, that participated in the tax system in relation to the sale
or purchase of delinquent properties, was rejected out-of-hand:
We cannot place the stamp of validity upon an allegation that makes count-
less persons, unknown for the most part to the plaintiff, the repositories of
that degree of confidence necessary to establish a fiduciary relationship.117
Regarding the nature of the trust and confidence 'allegedly reposed,
plaintiffs expectation that the designated parties would be fair and
just in relation to those in her position was deemed to lack the re-
quisite degree of specificity.
Finally, in regard to plaintiff's position that the defendant's at-
torney Gray, as an officer of the court, was bound by the canon of
ethics to, in effect, accept the confidence imposed, the court stated:
Indeed, to impose a duty on every lawyer "to communicate with [property
owner] about the consequences of [their] tax deficiency other than through
the formal service of notice" could well put him in peril of violating those
canons of ethics. This argument of the plaintiff is manifestly unaccept-
able. 118
Accordingly, because the plaintiff failed to show fraud at law, con-
structive fraud in equity," 9 or the abuse of 'a clearly established fidu-
ciary relationship, the order of the trial court imposing the construc-
tive trust was reversed.
In the case of Durkee v. Franklin Savings Association, 20 the
second appellate district discussed the scope of fiduciary relation-
ships. The court found no merit in the plaintiffs' assertion of a fidu-
ciary relationship between themselves as mortgagors and the defend-
ant as mortgagee for purposes of imposing a constructive trust on
117. Id. at 762, 307 N.E.2d at 743.
118. Id.
119. For a comparison of the concept of constructive fraud with fraud at law,
whether intentional, negligent, or innocent, see Jackson v. Seymour, 193 Va. 735, 71
S.E.2d 181 (1952).
120. 17 Il. App. 3d 978, 309 N.E.2d 118 (1974).
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profits received from the defendant's investment of pre-paid real
estate tax funds.'21
The Constructive Trust: Accounting-Receivers
As mentioned above, once fraud or the abuse of the requisite fidu-
ciary relationship warranting the imposition of a constructive trust
is found to exist, the device of equitable accounting, where deemed
necessary, may be brought into play to locate and identify the trust
"corpus" giving rise to the action. In the case of Hurst v. Papierz,122
the first appellate district discussed the requisite mode of conducting
an accounting in light of state constitutional provisions eliminating
masters in chancery and other fee officers from the judicial sys-
tem.123
In Papierz, the plaintiffs sought the imposition of a constructive
trust on the profits of a certain apartment complex with reconvey-
ance to them of certain units, because they had been defrauded by
the defendant-joint venturers. They also sought an accounting and
the appointment of a receiver to preserve income during the pend-
ency of the suit. The trial court appointed a receiver and engaged
a private accounting firm to determine the net sums owing to the
plaintiffs.
On appeal, the court first addressed defendant's argument that
Illinois law requires an accounting procedure which gives the party
defendant the absolute right to present its evidence and challenge
all computations and findings:
We find no authority in law for a method of accounting which does not set
forth a procedure by which evidentiary questions may be adjudicated ....
On the hearing they have a right to introduce evidence, cross-examine wit-
nesses and take the various steps authorized by law to protect their
rights. 124
In regard to the engagement of a private accounting firm, the de-
fendants argued that the only method recognized in Illinois was the
appointment of a master in chancery. The court, however, noting
121. But see Buchanan v. Brentwood Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, - Pa. -, 320 A.2d
117 (1974).
122. 16 Il. App. 3d 574, 306 N.E.2d 532 (1st Dist. 1974).
123. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 14.
124. 16 Ill. App. 3d at 579, 306 N.E.2d at 536.
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the constitutional prohibition against the employment of masters in
chancery set forth the current requirements with respect to equitable
accountings:
ITihe trial court itself must conduct the accounting, try all the issues, ad-
minister full relief to the parties and grant a judgment for the balance found
due. In so doing, it is suggested that the trial court should follow estab-
lished accounting procedures, except that it should not refer the case to a
master or other fee officer as prohibited by the Illinois Constitution.' 25
As to the propriety of the trial court's appointment of a receiver,
the appellate court, while acknowledging the harshness of the rem-
edy and the disruption that it caused to the daily functioning of an
established commercial entity, upheld the action:
Appointment of a receiver is considered generally to be a harsh remedy.
Nevertheless, it resides in the arsenal of equitable remedies to be used when
in the sound discretion of the chancellor it is needed to insure complete
justice is done between the parties.' 26
A much clearer statement of the same principle was made in the
recent case of Duval v. Severson,11 7 where in the course of its deci-
sion to refuse the appointment of a receiver in a case involving a cor-
porate dispute over financial policy, the court stated:
A court of equity has the power to appoint a receiver of a corporation when
conditions of dissension, dispute, fraud or mismanagement exist which make
it impossible for the corporation to carry out its business or preserve its
assets, but such power should only be exercised in cases of urgent necessity
where there is a present peril to the interests of the stockholders consisting
of a suspension of corporate business and a threatened depreciation of cor-
porate assets.128
Finally, in Papierz, the defendant maintained that the appoint-
ment of a receiver, when based upon allegations of fraud as opposed
to corporate dissension or mismanagement, must be grounded in ac-
tual fraud at law, not "constructive" fraud, which is the equitable
concept utilized to initiate restitutional relief where the facts appear
to warrant it in the absence of actual fraud. In rejecting the defend-
ant's position as "empty rhetoric," the court held that the particular
circumstances surrounding the case determine the propriety of the
125. Id. at 580, 306 N.E.2d at 537.
126. Id., 306 N.E.2d at 538.
127. 15 II. App. 3d 634, 304 N.E.2d 747 (1st Dist. 1973).
128. Id. at 642-43, 304 N.E.2d at 753.
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appointment of a receiver, regardless of whether the basis is charac-
terized as actual or "constructive" fraud. 12 9
Injunctions
In addition to effecting restitution through the conceptual vehicle
of the constructive trust, the imposition of equitable liens to protect
security interests and the ordering of specific performance of con-
tractual agreements, 80 an additional mainstay of equity jurisprud-
ence is the powerful remedy of the injunction. The Illinois Injunc-
tion Act'' sets forth the basis for the granting of injunctive relief,
both temporary and permanent. The discussion to follow will utilize
a series of recent Illinois decisions dealing with various technical as-
pects relevant to the granting of injunctive relief. Since the greater
number of these cases fortify earlier Illinois rulings, an attempt will
be made to place them in the general context of Illinois law in this
area by way of citation.
Sections 3 and 3-1 of the Illinois Injunction Act delineate the pre-
requisites to the issuance of a temporary restraining order or tempor-
ary injunction.'13 Section 3 provides:
No court or judge shall grant a preliminary injunction without previous
notice of the time and place of the application having been given the ad-
verse party unless it clearly appears, from specific facts shown by the veri-
fied complaint or by affidavit accompanying the same, that immediate and
irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the applicant before notice
can be served and hearing had thereon. 188
Section 3-1, dealing with temporary restraining orders, contains
identical language, but adds additional guidelines relative to the
automatic expiration of the order and the later issuance of a tempor-
ary injunction in the same matter. 8 4
129. Constructive fraud is a breach of a legal or equitable duty, which irres-
pective of the moral guilt . . . the law declares fraudulent. . . . Neither
actual dishonesty of purpose nor intent to deceive is an essential element
of constructive fraud. An intent to deceive is an essential element of actual
fraud. The presence or absence of such an intent distinguishes actual fraud
from constructive fraud.
Moore v. Gregory, 146 Va. 504, 523, 131 S.E. 692, 697 (1925).
130. While such orders are injunctive in form, they are generally considered as
an appropriate area for separate analysis. See discussion at pp. 317-18 infra.
131. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 69 (1973).
132. Id. §§ 3, 3-1.
133. Id. § 3.
134. Id. § 3-1.
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The issuance of a temporary injunction is an extraordinary rem-
edy, requiring that the party seeking it make a clear showing of a
need to preserve the status quo in regard to the situation underlying
the request.135 The status quo to be preserved by the injunction
is the last, actual, peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the
pending controversy. 13 6  Such need is only deemed to exist if the
plaintiff pleads or proves, in cases of issuance after a hearing, spe-
cific facts showing a definite threat of irreparable harm to a clearly
recognized right,117 with no adequate remedy at law.'3 8
In addition to the foregoing, the party seeking the temporary in-
junction must establish to the court's satisfaction, the likelihood of
success on the merits at the hearing prior to the issuance of a per-
manent injunction. 139  Also, the sufficiency of the pleading or proof
in the above respects is within the sound discretion of the trial
court,140 with the exception of certain statutory requisites such as
bonding or the form of the order issued. 4' In cases where the tem-
135. Summit Elec. Co. v. Mayrent, 17 Ill. App. 3d 545, 308 N.E.2d 313 (1st Dist.
1974). See also McErlean v. Harvey Area Commun. Org., 9 111. App. 3d 527, 292
N.E.2d 479 (1st Dist. 1972); Western Leasing Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 4 Ill. App. 3d 704,
281 N.E.2d 444 (1st Dist. 1972).
136. Duval v. Severson, 15 111. App. 3d 634, 304 N.E.2d 747 (1st Dist. 1973).
See also Millikan v. Jensen, 4 Ill. App. 3d 580, 281 N.E.2d 401 (3d Dist. 1972);
American Snacks Inc. v. Schaul, 132 Il. App. 2d 718, 270 N.E.2d 209 (1st Dist.
1971); O'Brien v. Matual, 14 ill. App. 2d 173, 144 N.E.2d 446 (2d Dist. 1957).
137. Larkin v. Howlett, 19 111. App. 3d 343, 311 N.E.2d 367 (4th Dist. 1974);
Potter v. School Dir. of Dist. No. 87, 17 Ill. App. 3d 781, 309 N.E.2d 58 (4th Dist.
1974); Schwalm Elect. Inc. v. Electrical Prod. Corp., 14 Ill. App. 3d 16, 302 N.E.2d
348 (Ist Dist. 1973). See also Jacobs v. Regas, 75 Ill. App. 2d 140, 221 N.E.2d
283 (1st Dist. 1966); Triangle Sign Co. v. Randolph & State Property, 16 Ill. App.
2d 21, 147 N.E.2d 451 (1st Dist. 1957).
138. Larkin v. Howlett, 19 Ill. App. 3d 343, 311 N.E.2d 367 (4th Dist. 1974);
G.H. Sternberg & Co. v. Cellini, 16 Il. App. 3d 1, 305 N.E.2d 317 (5th Dist. 1973);
Master Barbers' & Beauty Culturists' Ass'n of Chicago, Inc. v. Grajek, 11 I11. App.
3d 780, 298 N.E.2d 353 (1st Dist. 1973). See also Mars, Inc. v. Curtiss Candy Co.,
8 Ill. App. 3d 338, 290 N.E.2d 701 (1st Dist. 1972); Schlicksup Drug Co. v. Schlick-
sup, 129 Il. App. 2d 181, 262 N.E.2d 713 (3d Dist. 1970).
139. Filter Dynamics Int'l Co. v. Astrom Battery Inc., 19 Ill. App. 3d 299, 311
N.E.2d 386 (2d Dist. 1974). See also Mars, Inc. v. Curtiss Candy Co., 8 Ill. App.
3d 338, 290 N.E.2d 701 (1st Dist. 1972).
140. Master Barbers' & Beauty Culturists' Ass'n of Chicago, Inc. v. Grajek, 11
Ill. App. 3d 780, 298 N.E.2d 353 (1st Dist. 1973). See also Schlicksup Drug Co.
v. Schlicksup, 129 Il. App. 2d 181, 262 N.E.2d 713 (3d Dist. 1970); People ex rel.
Bolton v. Progressive Gen. Ins. Co., 84 Ill. App. 2d 109, 228 N.E.2d 146 (1st Dist.
1967).
141. Bohn Aluminum & Brass Co. v. Barker, 20 Ill. App. 3d 20, 312 N.E.2d 722
(4th Dist, 1974) (failure to require the posting of bond).
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porary injunction sought is mandatory in nature, the requisites of
pleading and proof are even more stringent, especially if full relief
can be afforded the party after a final hearing.'42
In instances where no notice has been given or no answer filed,
the injunction may issue solely on the basis of the sufficiency of the
verified complaint. However, where an answer has been filed, both
pleadings must be considered. If the answer contains denials of
material fact, a hearing on these matters must be held before the
injunction can issue.' 48
Due to the extraordinary nature of the injunctive remedy, pro-
vision is made in Supreme Court Rule 307144 for an interlocutory
appeal to challenge the issuance or refusal to issue the order due
to the presence or absence of the requisites noted above. The Rule
provides as follows:
(a) Orders appealable; Time. An appeal may be taken to the Appellate
Court from an interlocutory order of court
(1) granting, modifying, refusing, dissolving, or refusing to dissolve an
injunction.145
On such an appeal, the court is limited to the determination of
whether any of the aforementioned requisites were sufficiently es-
tablished by the pleadings or proof and may not base its decision
on the merits of the case.' 40
Where a party has failed to object to the form or content of the
order ultimately issued or other requisites of the Act, this constitutes
a waiver of such issues for purposes of the interlocutory appeal.' 7
142. Moehling v. N. & J. Enterprises, Ltd., 15 Ill. App. 3d 987, 305 N.E.2d 183
(1st Dist. 1973). See also National Bank v. River Forest State Bank, 3 Ill. App.
3d 209, 278 N.E.2d 501 (lst Dist. 1971).
143. Summit Elec. Co. v. Mayrent, 17 II1. App. 3d 545, 308 N.E.2d 313 (1st Dist.
1974). See also Professional Business Manage., Inc. v. Clark, 83 I11. App. 2d 236,
227 N.E.2d 371 (3d Dist. 1967); Centennial Laundry Co. v. West Side Org.,
55 I11. App. 2d 406, 204 N.E.2d 589 (1st Dist. 1965).
144. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, § 307(a)(1) (1973).
145. Id.
146. Duval v. Severson, 15 Ill. App. 3d 634, 304 N.E.2d 747 (lst Dist. 1973).
See also Lonergan v. Crucible Steel Co. of America, 37 Ill. 2d 599, 229 N.E.2d
536 (1967).
147. Somerset Importers, Ltd. v. Gold Standard Liquors Inc., 18 Ill. App. 3d 39,
309 N.E.2d 286 (1st Dist. 1974); Perlman v. First Nat'l Bank, 15 Ill. App. 3d 784,
305 N.E.2d 236 (1st Dist. 1973). See also Vermillion County Prod. Credit .Ass'n
v. Izzard, 111 Il. App. 2d 190, 249 N.E.2d 352 (4th Dist. 1969).
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Finally, the form and content of consent decrees are not generally
subject to interlocutory appeal since they are viewed as a recital of
agreement between the parties and not a judicial determination of
their rights.' 48
The injunction once issued, whether in temporary or permanent
form, must be obeyed even if it is later determined to have been
entered in error, including even errors of constitutional magni-
tude. 149 The court may award costs' 50 and interest in instances of
corrollary damage awards,' 5 ' but it may not award attorney's fees
outside of express statutory authority.' 52
Finally, in the course of a contempt hearing for alleged violations
of a temporary or permanent injunction, the underlying injunction
may not be collaterally attacked if the issuing court had jurisdic-
tion.15 3
Limitations on Equitable Relief.
Laches, Equitable Estoppel, and Clean Hands
Aside from instances where plaintiffs pleading or proof fails to
meet the substantive requirements for various types of equitable re-
lief, several major equitable defenses exist which may limit the avail-
ability of an equitable remedy, even where the plaintiff has satisfied
the prima facie requisites of his action. Three of these defenses,
laches, equitable estoppel, and the "clean hands" doctrine, will be
analyzed at this point in the context of recent Illinois decisions.
The modem parameters of the defense of laches, applicable like
equitable estoppel and the clean hands doctrine to any type of equity
148. People ex rel. Ill. State Dental Soc'y v. Iole, 19 Ill. App. 3d 894, 312 N.E.2d
328 (1st Dist. 1974). See also James v. James, 14 Il. 2d 295, 152 N.E.2d 582(1958).
149. People v. Mulgrew, 19 Ill. App. 3d 327, 311 N.E.2d 378 (2d Dist. 1974).
See also U.M.W. Hosp. v. U.M.W., 52 I11. 2d 496, 288 N.E. 455 (1972); County
of Peoria v. Benedict, 47 Ill. 2d 166, 265 N.E.2d 141 (1970); Keck v. Keck, 8 Ill.
App. 3d 277, 290 N.E.2d 385 (Ist Dist. 1972).
150. Kolkovich v. Tosolin, 19 Ill. App. 3d 524, 311 N.E.2d 782 (4th Dist. 1974).
151. Atwater v. Atwater, 18 Il1. App. 3d 202, 309 N.E.2d 632 (5th Dist. 1974).
152. Anundson v. City of Chicago, 15 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 305 N.E.2d 376 (1st
Dist. 1973); People ex rel. III. Dental Soc'y v. Iole, 19 I11. App. 3d 894, 312 N.E.2d
328 (1st Dist. 1974).
153. Buckingham Corp. v. Modem Liquors, Inc., 16 Ill. App. 3d 534, 306 N.E.2d
655 (lst Dist. 1973).
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action, were set forth by the Illinois Supreme Court in the early case
of Pyle v. Ferell,11 4 where the court stated:
[A] suit is held to be barred on the ground of laches or stale demand "where
and only where" the following facts are disclosed: (1) Conduct on the
part of the defendant giving rise to the situation of which complaint is
made and for which the complainant seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting
the complainant's rights, the complainant having had notice or knowledge
of defendant's conduct and the opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of
knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant
would assert the right on which he bases his suit, and (4) injury or prejud-
ice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant or the
suit is held not to be barred.155
Thus, laches is such neglect or omission to assert a right, which,
when considered with the lapse of time involved and all the facts
and circumstances of the case, causes prejudice to the party defend-
ant. Being an affirmative defense, laches, in the above terms, must
be pleaded by the party raising it and supported by sufficient facts.'
Additionally, laches will not arguably apply until such time as the
party against whom the defense is asserted discovered or should have
discovered the facts. 157
As to the relation between the concept of laches and an applicable
statute of limitation, the. courts have consistently held that laches, un-
like a limitation statute, is not based simply on the factor of delay.
In some instances the courts have found laches to apply, thus barring
the action, even though an applicable statute of limitation had not
run relative to the substantive basis of plaintiffs claim.15
Equitable estoppel, on the other hand, while conceptually similar
to laches and often confused with it, is mainly based on the factor
of affirmative conduct on the part of the party against whom it is
asserted and accompanying detrimental reliance on the part of the
party raising the defense. As stated by the Illinois Supreme Court
in the case of Hickey v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.: 59
[W]here a party by his statements or conduct leads another to do some-
thing he would not have done but for the statements or conduct of the
154. 12 Ill. 2d 547, 147 N.E.2d 341 (1958).
155. id. at 553, 147 N.E.2d at 344.
156. Harden v. Desideri, 20 Il1. App. 3d 590, 315 N.E.2d 235 (1st Dist. 1974).
157. See, e.g., Tarpoff v. Karandjeff, 17 Ill. 2d 462, 162 N.E.2d 1 (1959).
158. See, e.g., Slatin's Properties, Inc. v. Hassler, 53 II1. 2d 325, 291 N.E.2d 641
(1973).
159. 35 Ill. 2d 427, 220 N.E.2d 415 (1966).
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other, the one guilty of the expressions or conduct will not be allowed to
deny his utterances or acts to the loss or damage of the other party. The
party claiming the estoppel must have relied upon the acts or representa-
tions of the other and have had no knowledge or convenient means of
knowing the true facts....
Where silence is the ground of the estoppel it is essential that the party
estopped should have knowledge of the facts and the other party be ignorant
of the truth and be misled into doing that which he would not have done
except for such silence. 160
Since equitable estoppel is also an affirmative defense, the burden
of proving it is on the party asserting it.'"'
Two recent Illinois decisions, Perlman v. First National Bank'
and Atwater v. Atwater,'6 address both equitable defenses, illus-
trate the fine line between them and serve as examples of the wide
variety of equitable actions in which the defenses may be raised.
In re Estate of Vandeventer,164 to follow the above cases, discusses
the applicability of laches to the exercise of governmental functions.
In Perlman, a commercial borrower of the defendant bank
brought a class action seeking the imposition of a constructive trust
on the aggregate amount of interest allegedly illegally collected by
defendant on its commercial loans, due to their computation of
annual interest over a ten year period on the basis of a 360 day
calendar year, in violation of the 365 day year required by the Il-
linois Interest Act. 6 5 The plaintiff sought the establishment of a
fund and restitution due to defendant's unjust enrichment. The trial
court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint and
appeal was taken.
After noting the clear statutory requirement of a 365 day calendar
year unless otherwise specified and rejecting defendant's assertion
that the "universal" bank custom of computing interest on commer-
cial loans on a 360 day period should govern the relationship be-
tween the parties, the court addressed the defendant's affirmative
defenses of laches and equitable estoppel. The defendant argued
160. Id. at 447, 220 N.E.2d at 425 (emphasis added).
161. Forest v. Forest, 9 11. App. 3d 111, 291 N.E.2d 880 (5th Dist. 1973).
162. 15 Ill. App. 3d 784, 305 N.E.2d 236 (1st Dist. 1973).
163. 18 111. App. 3d 202, 309 N.,E.2d 632 (5th Dist. 1974).
164. 16 111. App. 3d 163, 305 N.E.2d 299 (4th Dist. 1973).
165. ILL. Rnv. STAT. ch. 74, §§ 9-10 (1973).
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that the plaintiff's acquiesence in the customary rate over the years,
in the course of satisfying other loans, brought the defenses into play,
thus requiring dismissal of the instant suit. As to equitable estoppel,
the court began by noting that the 360 day "customary" interest
computation period was never publicly announced or disclosed in
any form of advertising or in any of the documents executed in the
course of finalizing the loan agreements. In rejecting the defense
of estoppel, the court stressed the importance of knowledge of rele-
vant facts being within the ken of the party against whom it is raised:
Not only is it doubtful that the Bank can show how the plaintiffs had
knowledge of the facts other than by the bills that they paid, but it is cer-
tain that the Bank did have knowledge of the facts. Acceptance of the
argument of the Bank would indeed be a strange twist of the law that would
permit the party with knowledge of the facts to estop the party without
knowledge. 166
On the issue of laches, the defendant again raised plaintiff's knowl-
edge through prior payments and alleged substantial prejudice from
the delay, thus justifying the court in barring the action. The court,
on the basis of plaintiff's lack of knowledge also held laches inapplic-
able, at least at the pleading stage. If however, at trial it could be
demonstrated that Perlman, through his accountant or otherwise, had
actual notice of the 360 day period, then laches could be utilized,
in the trial court's discretion, to bar the claim.
In Atwater v. Atwater,16 7 defendant's ex-wife brought an action
seeking payments due on a 1957 divorce settlement. By its terms,
in lieu of alimony, the plaintiff was to receive $127,500, $49,000
of which was paid. The remainder, until such time as plaintiff
should remarry, was to be paid in monthly installments of $1,000,
commencing four years from the date of entry of the decree. Only
one such payment was made. The plaintiff brought the instant ac-
tion some ten years later to which the defendant raised the defenses
of estoppel and laches.
Both defenses were based on the defendant's belief that the plain-
tiff had remarried, thus terminating all payments. He introduced
evidence that the plaintiff applied for a marriage license in Nevada
with one Mattson in 1958, that they lived together as man and wife
166. 15 Ill. App. 3d at 797, 305 N.E.2d at 246.
167. 18 Ill. App. 3d 202, 309 N.E.2d 632 (5th Dist. 1974).
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until 1971, that the defendant's attorney in 1961 had sent plaintiff
a letter stating that due to her remarriage no further payments would
be forthcoming, and that plaintiff had made no demand for payment
since that time. The plaintiff countered such evidence by proving
that she had not in fact remarried and that at a meeting between
the parties in 1961, at which she demanded payment, defendant was
informed of the fact. She did admit taking no further steps during
the ensuing ten years to enforce her rights.
In rejecting defendant's defense of equitable estoppel, the court
stressed the factor of defendant's knowledge of the true facts:
In order to claim reliance, one must be able to establish that he has acted
without knowledge of the truth of the matter represented to him.. . . The
facts herein do not present such a case. Defendant, after the September
1961 meeting acted with knowledge that plaintiff contended she was not
remarried. He could have initiated court action to have determined her
marital status and his obligation under the decree. That he voluntarily
chose to ignore her representation cannot now give rise to the interposition
of the defense of equitable estoppel ... 168
Regarding defendant's alleged detrimental reliance, the court
stressed that the change in his position inured to his benefit not
detriment, since he made no payments.
As to laches, the court noted that mere delay, even though ten
years as here, is not equivalent to laches, and that prejudice to the
party asserting the defense is also a necessity:
[Diefendant here has not suffered injury or prejudice as a result of plain-
tiffs delay. . . . T]he argument raised that defendant is injured because
he might be forced to pay in one lump sum as opposed to the contemplated
monthly installments is unimpressive.' 69
Here, the court continued, the defendant would be merely required
to fulfill his original obligation and the trial court's disallowance of
the equitable defenses was not error. 170
In a final case addressing the equitable defense of laches, the
fourth appellate district, in In re Estate of Vandeventer,17' held
laches inapplicable to the exercise of governmental functions.
168. Id. at 210, 309 N.E.2d at 639.
169. Id. at 209, 309 N.E.2d at 638.
170. The court also upheld that portion of the order refusing to grant plaintiff
$28,000 in interest on the basis that because of the delay, the interest payment, as
opposed to that of the principal, would be inequitable.
171. 16 Il1. App. 3d 163, 305 N.E.2d 299 (4th Dist. 1973).
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Vandeventer was declared incompetent in 1931 and was placed
in Jackson State Hospital until his release in 1971 and replacement
in a shelter home for the aged. In 1969, letters of conservatorship
were issued to defendant's estate. In 1972, the Department of
Mental Health, pursuant to statute, 172 filed a claim for payment for
the care and treatment provided in the forty year period.
The defendant raised the defense of laches, asserting that the re-
quirement of payment after a forty year lapse, even though the stat-
ute has no payment limitation relative to claims brought against the
estate,171 would cause substantial prejudice relative to the estate as-
sets. In addition, the defendant urged that any type of general re-
fusal to allow the defense of laches against a governmental unit
would be a vestige of the currently disfavored principle of sovereign
immunity.
In rejecting the estate's position in that regard and its defense of
laches, the court stated:
The difficulty with such argument is that the doctrine of sovereign immun-
ity is not alone the rationale of denying laches as a bar to an action by the
state. More important is the public policy involved and the possibility that
application of laches or estoppel doctrines may impair the functioning of
the State in the discharge of its governmental functions and that valuable
public interest may be jeopardized or lost by the negligence in the State or
inattention of public officials.174
As to the facts of the case at bar, the court noted that requiring the
estate to pay the costs of the benefits received at this date would
only require it to pay what it should have paid in the past.
The final case to be discussed with regard to the limitations on
equitable relief, Excellent Builders, Inc. v. Pioneer Trust & Sav-
ings,'75 analyzes the equitable defense known as the "clean hands"
doctrine.
Briefly stated, the "clean hands" doctrine provides that in in-
stances where equitable relief of any type is sought, even if the party
seeking it has established a substantive basis for relief, the parties
will be left where they stand if the moving party is guilty of illegal
172. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/Y2, § 12-12 (1973).
173. There is a five year payment limit in suits brought against responsible rela-
tives. Id.
174. 16 Ill. App. 3d at 164, 305 N.E.2d at 300-01.
175. 15 Ill. App. 3d 832, 305 N.E.2d 273 (1st Dist. 1973).
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or inequitable conduct on his own part.17 6 The general equitable
position that a co-wrongdoer is not entitled to relief is subject how-
ever, to an exception where the culpability of the defendant far out-
weighs that of the party seeking relief. In an interesting modem
application of this exception, the first appellate district in Pioneer
Trust & Savings analyzed what the court refered to as the doctrine
of "balancing degrees of culpability," in relation to its application
of the doctrine to the sought establishment and enforcement of a
mechanics lien.
The plaintiff sought to foreclose on a mechanics lien resulting
from efforts expended on new construction work performed for de-
fendant, the beneficiary of a land trust. The plaintiff had secured
a building permit on the basis of plans and specifications submitted
to it by the defendant. The evidence established that, earlier, one
of the land trust beneficiaries had obtained rezoning of the premises
on the basis of plans different than those turned over to the plaintiff
for purposes of securing the building permit. The permit was re-
voked and work halted by the city upon discovery that the latter set
of plans violated city zoning ordinances. The trial court entered
summary judgment for the defendant because of the resulting illegal-
ity of the contract underlying the lien foreclosure request.
On appeal, the defendants argued non-liability on the basis that
Illinois law requires that a valid contract exist before a lien may
attach. 17 7 Since the contract here violated zoning regulations on its
face, it was void, and hence, per statute, could not serve to establish a
mechanic's lien. In response, the plaintiff argued that even if the
contract was illegal on its face, defendant's culpability in its fraud
upon the city called for enforcement of the lien.
The court noted the absence of precise authority utilizing the doc-
trine of "balancing degrees of culpability" in a mechanics lien
setting. But after analyzing the early case of Evans v. Funk,178 the
court held the general principles of the doctrine applicable to the
case at bar:
As between the parties, plaintiff's participation in the fraud on the city of
Chicago was purely formal and passive in that, as required by the contract,
176. See D. DoBBs, supra note 78, at 45-46.
177. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 82, § 1 (1973).
178. 151 Ill. 650, 38 N.E. 230 (1894).
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it merely applied for the permit on the basis of the illegal plans and spe-
cifications which had been furnished to it but took no active part in the
alleged fraud by reason of which the permit wrongfully issued. It is our
opinion that the allegations of fact, if true, would invoke the doctrine of
imbalance of culpability as between the parties. 179
While acknowledging that the mechanics lien, being in derogation
of the common law, required strict construction, the court held that
validating this contract for lien purposes would prevent the more
culpable party from benefiting from his own wrongdoing, thus con-
tributing to the public order. Accordingly, the summary judgment
was reversed and the case remanded for trial.
IV. ELECTION OF REMEDIES
The final group of cases to be analyzed in this survey of Illinois
remedies deals with the confusing and misunderstood principle
known as the election of remedies doctrine. In its most basic state-
ment, the doctrine provides that a party plaintiff is bound by his
choice of a particular remedy if there are two or more inconsistent
remedies available to him to satisfy an alleged wrong and the plain-
tiff takes affirmative action pursuant to one of them. 8 0
Unfortunately, the doctrine is not restricted in application to any
set grouping of "remedies," to any type of actions deemed to consti-
tute an "election," nor to any stage in the course of dispute or litiga-
tion as to when an election can take place.' 8 The doctrine even
applies with respect to the binding choice of a remedy among mul-
tiple party defendants. Additionally, many courts will utilize the
conceptual label of "election of remedies" in instances where the
case could be more properly disposed of on the more familiar
grounds of res judicata, waiver, or estoppel." 2 Finally, since the
doctrine appears to be in disfavor in many jurisdictions, the minimal
parameters of the doctrine are stretched to the breaking point to
avoid the often harsh and unnecessary results of its application.
Two recent Illinois decisions, Geist v. Lehman, 83 and Schwartz
179. 15 Il1. App. 3d at 838, 305 N.E.2d at 278.
180. See generally D. DoBBs, supra note 78, at 13-23.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 19-20.
183. 19 Iil. App. 3d 557, 312 N.E.2d 42 (2d Dist. 1974).
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v. City of Chicago,18 4 in the context of disputes involving real prop-
erty, discuss the factor of prejudice to the defendant, which is the
major basis for the doctrine's applicability. The cases provide inter-
esting examples of the efforts taken by courts to avoid it.
In Lehman, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a contract
for the sale and purchase of residential property. Upon examination
of the legal description and survey by the buyer's counsel, a variance
was found from the acreage specified in the contract of sale. The
buyer Geist demanded a correction of all title defects or the contract
would be treated as rescinded. Following the closing date, at which
time the seller stood ready to close, the buyer filed for rescission
based upon the seller's innocent misrepresentations regarding the
acreage. The seller in turn filed suit for specific performance and
the two cases were consolidated.
During the pendency of the suits two fires caused extensive dam-
age to the residence on the property. A decree of specific perform-
ance was granted the seller and the buyer filed an amended com-
plaint based on the clause in the contract of sale allowing him to
treat the agreement as null and void if there were material damage
to the premises prior to closing. The seller then sought the vacation
of the earlier decree of specific performance in his favor and the
reaffirmance of the dismissal of the purchaser's rescission suit, be-
cause of the latter's subsequent bankruptcy and the fact that the fire
insurance carrier would only deal with the seller. The trial court
dismissed the buyer's suit, vacated the order of specific performance,
and allowed the seller to elect forfeiture of the earnest money as
damages.
The appellate court, after reviewing the evidence, affirmed the
dismissal of the purchaser's rescission suit and upheld the propriety
of the court's vacating its earlier decree of specific performance:
It has long been recognized that when events subsequent to the execution
of a contract produce a change of circumstances of such a nature as to
cause a peculiar hardship or an inequitable result, a court of equity will
refuse to grant specific performance.' 8 5
Geist then argued that by pursuing the remedy of specific perform-
184. 21 111. App. 3d 84, 315 N.E.2d 215 (1st Dist. 1974). For a discussion of
this case with respect to the injury to realty damage issue, see p. 296 supra.
185. 19 Ill. App. 3d at 561, 312 N.E.2d at 46.
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ance to judgment, Lehman was precluded from now seeking for-
feiture due to the election of remedies doctrine.
Prior to responding to Geist's position, the court noted the scope
of the doctrine:
Generally, where a party obtains a decision on the issues but fails to obtain
satisfaction of his claim, the party is precluded from seeking another rem-
edy when the other remedy is inconsistent with the first remedy sought.' 86
The remedies of specific performance in equity and forfeiture of a
contract are inconsistent, the court conceded, inasmuch as the equity
action is predicated upon the continued validity of the contract after
breach, while the latter is based upon disaffirmance of the contract
after breach.
However, the court continued, the election of remedies doctrine
envisages a choice involving actual as opposed to theoretical "in-
consistency":
The doctrine of election of remedies however, presupposes a choice between
two or more existing inconsistent remedies. Accordingly, if a party has but
one remedy, a mistaken resort to an unavailable inconsistent remedy will
not bar him from later choosing his correct remedy unless the other party
has relied on the election of the first remedy. 18 7
Here, due to the intervening fires, the equitable remedy of specific
performance was not really "available" to the seller. By way of the
interesting exercise in semantics quoted above, plaintiff's clear elec-
tion to judgment was deemed no election at all.
In Schwartz v. City of Chicago, 8 the other election of remedies
case selected for study, the affirmative defense was raised in a suit
seeking damages from the city for the negligent failure to notify
plaintiff of the scheduled demolition of a building subject to a tax
certificate. The facts and decision relative to the appropriate dam-
age model in such cases have been discussed in the damages section
of this article.
In the suit for damages, plaintiffs also sought and received a stat-
utory refund in return for the surrender of the certificate. After
plaintiffs received their refund, the legislature amended the relevant
statute to provide that upon application of the tax purchaser that the
186. Id. at 563, 312 N.E.2d at 47.
187. Id.
188. 21 111. App. 3d 84, 312 NE.20 215 (1st Dist. 1974),
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improvements on the realty have been substantially destroyed prior
to the issuance of a tax deed, such sale can be voided and refund
made.1""
The city argued that the legislature thus intended the refund op-
tion to be an exclusive remedy, or in the alternative, that plaintiffs
had elected a binding inconsistent remedy and hence could not seek
damages. After holding the refund provision to be a cumulative and
not exclusive remedy, the court addressed the election of remedies
issue:
The doctrine of election among cumulative remedies does not apply when
multiple avenues of remedy are pursued, as long as double compensation
of the plaintiff is not threatened, the defendant has not been actually mis-
led by the plaintiff's conduct and res judicata principles cannot be applied
to bar an inconsistent theory.19 0
The decisions in Geist v. Lehman910 and Schwartz v. City of
Chicago9 2 serve as good examples of the paucity of concreteness
in the much maligned doctrine of election of remedies. By stressing
the need for the actual as opposed to theoretical availability of in-
consistent remedies in Lehman and the absence of double compen-
sation, res judicata or estoppel in Schwartz, the questionable utility
of the doctrine as a separate affirmative defense in Illinois seems
apparent. While the doctrine has and continues to be the basis for
denying relief in a variety of commercial law settings in other juris-
dictions, 13 the Illinois lawyer, until some definitive writing is done
in the area, remains in the dark as to the relative dangers of the
eventual hard choice of remedies decision.
189.. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 741 (1973).
-190., 21 Ill. App. 3d at 94, 312 N.E.2d at 224.
191. 19 Ill. App. 3d 557, 312 N.E.2d 42 (2d Dist. 1974).
192. 21 Ill. App. 3d 84, 312 N.E.2d 215 (1st Dist. 1974).
* 193. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Homestead Minerals Corp., 513 P.2d 219 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1973) (successful.. action to remove corporate prohibition against sale of stock
barred later damage action for same prohibition).
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